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Abstract. In this paper, a non-linear mathematical model for the spread of two political parties has
been proposed and analyzed by using epidemiological approach. The whole population is assumed
to be a constant and homogeneously mixed. Equilibria have been obtained analytically and their
local and global stability have been discussed. Conditions for the co-existence of both the political
parties have been obtained. Numerical simulation is also performed to support the analytical results.
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1 Introduction
Democracy is a system of government by which political independence is retained by
the people and exercised directly by citizens. The unique characteristic of democracy is
the source of power for a government by the people and for the people. The essential
process in democracies is competitive elections. An election is a decision-making process
by which a population chooses an individual to hold formal office. This is the usual
mechanism by which democracy fills offices in the legislature and parliament [1].
The Constitution of India provides single and uniform citizenship for the whole nation
and grants the right to vote every person who is a citizen of India and who acquires
18 years of age. In the parliamentary and legislature elections India follows the single
vote method, in which each voter votes for one candidate and the candidate who receives
maximum votes wins, even if he receives less than a majority of votes.
In most of the democratic countries, the voting system is single vote method and
generally two major political parties exist. If any other minor party exists then that party
joins any one of the major parties based on their ideology and circumstances. Both the
political parties contact the voters class for joining their party. Now a days the shifting
of individuals from one political party to other has become a common trend. As some of
the party members/workers who do not get proper weight/positions in their party or they
are not very much satisfied with the changes occurring in the party’s ideology, they leave
their original party and join the second party.
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Some modeling studies have been conducted regarding the growth of political parties
and voters [2–7]. In most of the modeling studies statistical methodology is being used
by considering that two political parties are competing for the voters class. In particular,
Belenky and King [2] in their model considered two political parties, which compete
for the votes of undecided voters who do not vote in US Federal elections. They have
considered the role of election campaigns by all competing candidates on these voters.
Khan [6] studied a multiparty political system by using nonlinear differential equations
with time delay. In this model, three political parties and a class of people who are not
member of any political party have been considered. In this study a predator-prey type
model for the interactions between the parties have been considered and the conditions for
Hopf-bifurcation have also been derived. Huckfeldt and Kohfeld [5] have presented two
mathematical models, one linear and another nonlinear regarding the electoral stability
and the decline of class in democratic politics by considering two political parties. In the
linear model they have considered behavioral independence within the electorate and in
the nonlinear model behavioral interdependence has been considered. In both the models
the movement from one political party to other has also been considered.
In the above models, the epidemic approach has not been used in the modeling pro-
cess, however Calderon et al. [3] have studied a nonlinear mathematical model for the
spread of political third parties in American politics by using an epidemiological ap-
proach. As during the elections, the party members make door-to-door campaigning and
convince the persons to vote for their party so it is more appropriate to use epidemic
approach in the modeling process of political parties. During the elections party members
also appeal to the voters to join their party based on the ideology of their party. By
using epidemiological approach, the study of Calderon et al. [3] was limited and main
focus has been given only to the expansion of the third party. They have not consid-
ered the role of two other major parties on the political system. In the simplified model
they have considered three classes namely susceptible class (those people who vote,
but do not vote to third party), voters class (those people who vote for third party) and
members class (party officials, donors etc.). In the general model they have divided the
susceptible class and voters class into two parts on the basis of affinity (high or low)
to the third party’s ideology. In the modeling process they have assumed that the total
population participating in the system is constant. Many dynamical social phenomenon
may be modelled by using the epidemiological type differential equations [8, 9]. In the
present study, we assume that individuals of voters class are susceptible to both the
political parties, like in epidemics, where two infective class and one susceptible class
have been considered [10].
Keeping above in view, in this paper, we model the growth of two political parties by
using the co-infection type epidemiological differential equations.
2 Mathematical model
Let N be the total population considered in the system, which is assumed to be a constant
and homogeneously mixed. This total population has been divided into three classes:
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(i) Voters class, (ii) Political party B class, and (iii) Political party C class. Due to the
assumption of a constant population size we assume that per capita exit rate is equal
to the per capita entering rate into the political system. As we know that most world-
wide constitutions gives the right of voting to individuals when they become 18 years
old, hence we assume that individuals enter into the voters class automatically with
the rate µN , where µ is the rate at which individuals enter or leave the voting sys-
tem. Due to the inactiveness and death, individuals exit from the political system from
each class with the rates µV , µB and µC respectively. In the modelling process, it is
considered that the individuals of voters class (V ) are susceptible to both the political
parties B and C. The members of both the political parties B and C contact the individ-
uals of the V class and try to convince them to join their party on the basis of party’s
ideology. Let k1 be the average number of contacts of members of political party B
with voters per unit time, and p1 be the probability of convincement per contact by
a voter with a member of party B then the per capita recruitment rate in party B is
β1 = p1k1. Thus the individuals in V class may decide to join the party B at a rate
β1V (B/N), where B/N is the chance of coming into contact with the members of
party B. Similarly we may find the per capita recruitment rate β2 in party C as p2k2,
where k2 is the average number of contacts of members of party C with voters per unit
time, and p2 be the probability of convincement per contact by a voter with a mem-
ber of party C. So the individuals in V class may decide to join the party C at a rate
β2V (C/N), where C/N is the chance of coming into contact with the members of
party C.
In the modeling process it is also assumed that members shift from one political party
to another when they are being contacted by the members of the other party. Let θ1 and θ2
be the per capita recruitment from party B to C and from C to B respectively. Thus the
members of party B leave their party with the rate θ1B(C/N) and join the party C with
the same rate. Similarly members of party C leave their party with the rate θ2C(B/N)
and join the party B with the same rate. The flow diagram of the model is shown in
Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Block diagram of the model.
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In view of the above assumptions and considerations, the governing equations of the
model may be written as follows:
dV
dt
= µN − β1V B
N
− β2V C
N
− µV,
dB
dt
= β1V
B
N
− θ1B C
N
+ θ2C
B
N
− µB,
dC
dt
= β2V
C
N
+ θ1B
C
N
− θ2C B
N
− µC,
(1)
where V (0) > 0, B(0) ≥ 0, C(0) ≥ 0.
Now adding all the three equations of model system (1), we obtain that dN/dt = 0
showing that the total population N is constant over time and V +B +C = N . Here we
may easily observe that the net shifting of members will be either from party B to party
C or vice versa. Thus, let us put θ1 − θ2 = θ. With this simplification, the above model
system (1) reduces to the following system:
dV
dt
= µN − β1V B
N
− β2V C
N
− µV,
dB
dt
= β1V
B
N
− θB C
N
− µB,
dC
dt
= β2V
C
N
+ θB
C
N
− µC.
(2)
Without loss of generality, we may assume that θ > 0. This assumption implies that
net rate of shifting of party members is from political party B to political party C.
Now we proportionalize our system by defining new variable v, b, c as proportions
of the total voting population N . Let v = V/N , b = B/N and c = C/N denotes the
proportionate variables of our system. Then the above system reduces to the following
form:
dv
dt
= µ− β1vb− β2vc− µv,
db
dt
= β1vb− θbc− µb,
dc
dt
= β2vc+ θbc− µc.
(3)
Let (v∗, b∗, c∗) be the equilibrium of the above model then v∗ = V ∗/N , b∗ = B∗/N
and c∗ = C∗/N , where (V ∗, B∗, C∗) be the equilibrium of the unreduced system (2). As
we know that total voting population is constant over time and V +B+C = N , this gives
v + b + c = 1 for the reduced system (3). Using this fact, the reduced model system (3)
will be given by the following two differential equations:
db
dt
= β1(1− b− c)b− θbc− µb,
dc
dt
= β2(1− b− c)c+ θbc− µc.
(4)
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The study of this model (4) is equivalent to the study of model system (1). Keeping this in
view we study the model system (4). The governing equations in the model system (4) are
ecological type equations. Now we analyze the above system (4) like ecological models
and interpret the results in terms of political science.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The model system (4) has four equilibria, which are as follows:
(i) Party free equilibrium E0(0, 0). This equilibrium always exists without any condition.
In terms of political science this situation corresponds to a nonpartisan. In a nonpartisan
system, no official political parties exist. In nonpartisan elections, each candidate is el-
igible for office on his/her own merits and capabilities. By putting the legal restrictions
on political parties, this situation may arise [11]. For example, in Pakistan there was
no political parties from 2001–2008. This situation arose because of restrictions on all
political parties in the above said period.
(ii) Single party equilibria E1(1− µ/β1, 0) and E2(0, 1− µ/β2). In this case there exist
two equilibria. The equilibrium E1(1 − µ/β1, 0) exists if the condition β1 > µ holds,
whereas the equilibrium E2(0, 1− µ/β2) exists if β2 > µ.
In the equilibrium E1(1 − µ/β1, 0), political party B exists whereas members in the
political party C are zero, i.e. political party B exists and political party C does not exist.
Similar explanation also holds for the equilibrium E2(0, 1− µ/β2), but in reverse order.
In single-party systems, one political party is legally allowed to hold effective power.
In this kind of system one political party has large number of members whereas the
other party has negligible members. The single-party system is generally corresponds
to dictatorship and may be taken as dominant-party systems. Examples of dominant
party systems include the “People’s Action Party” in Singapore and the “African National
Congress” in South Africa [11].
(iii) Interior/endemic equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗). This equilibrium may be obtained by solv-
ing the following two algebraic equations:
β1(1− b− c)− θc− µ = 0, (5)
β2(1− b− c) + θb− µ = 0. (6)
From the above equations (5) and (6), the values of b∗ and c∗ may be obtained as follows:
b∗ =
µ(β1 − β2)− θ(β2 − µ)
θ(β1 − β2 + θ) and c
∗ =
θ(β1 − µ)− µ(β1 − β2)
θ(β1 − β2 + θ) .
Here we note that v∗ = 1−b∗−c∗ = θ/(β1 − β2 + θ). As we already know that v∗ ∈ (0, 1],
this implies that β1 ≥ β2. If we take β1 = β2, then v∗ = 1 and b∗ = c∗ = 0. This is
the case of party free equilibrium and has been discussed earlier. Thus for the existence
of interior equilibrium we take β1 > β2.
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Keeping in mind that β1 > β2, the equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) exists provided parameters
of the model system (4) satisfy the following two more conditions:
µ(β1 − β2)− θ(β2 − µ) > 0, (7)
θ(β1 − µ)− µ(β1 − β2) > 0. (8)
In most of the worldwide countries mainly two political parties exist. In this case
the two political parties dominate the whole population of the country to such an extent
that electoral success under the banner of any other party is extremely difficult. If there
exist other parties then they may be minor parties and they collaborate to any one of the
major party. For example, in India there exists many regional (minor) parties but they are
not getting proper success. At the time of elections these regional parties collaborate to
one of the major parties. The other examples of the two-party systems are United States,
Jamaica, United Kingdom, etc. The United Kingdom is widely considered a two-party
state, as historically power alternates between two dominant parties, namely the Labour
party and the Conservative party [11].
4 Stability analysis
The general Jacobian matrix J of the model system (4) is given as follows:
J =
(
β1(1− 2b− c)− θc− µ −β1b− θb
−β2c+ θc β2(1− b− 2c) + θb− µ
)
.
Now we investigate the stability of various equilibria by finding eigenvalues of Jaco-
bian matrix J corresponding to each equilibria. Let Ji be the Jacobian matrix evaluated
at the equilibria Ei (i = 0, 1, 2, 3).
It is easy to check that the eigenvalues of the matrix J0 are β1 − µ and β2 − µ.
Since for the existence of equilibrium E1(1 − µ/β1, 0), β1 > µ and for the existence of
equilibrium E2(0, 1 − µ/β2), β2 > µ. Thus E0(0, 0) is unstable whenever equilibrium
E1 or E2 exists.
The eigenvalues of the matrix J1 are −(β1 − µ), which is negative and (θ(β1 − µ)−
µ(β1−β2))/β1, which is positive for the existence of equilibrium E3 (see condition (8)).
Thus E1(1− µ/β1, 0) is unstable whenever interior equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) exists.
Similarly the eigenvalues of the matrix J2 are (µ(β1 − β2) − θ(β2 − µ))/β2, which
is positive for the existence of equilibrium E3 (see condition (7)) and −(β2−µ),which is
negative. Since one eigenvalue of matrix J2 is positive, thus E2(0, 1− µ/β2) is unstable
whenever interior equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) exists.
The local stability behavior of E3(b∗, c∗) of model (4) is established by finding the
roots of characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at E3(b∗, c∗). The global
stability result has been proved by using the divergency criterion [12].
Theorem 1. The equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) whenever exists, is locally asymptotically stable
without any condition.
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Proof. The matrix J3 (J , evaluated at E3) is given as follows:
J3 =
( −β1b∗ −(β1 + θ)b∗
−(β2 − θ)c∗ −β2c∗
)
.
From the above matrix, we observe that trace(J3) = −(β1b∗ + β2c∗), which is negative
and |J3| = θ(β1 − β2 + θ)b∗c∗, which is positive (since β1 > β2). This implies that both
the eigenvalues of the matrix J3 will be either negative or having negative real part. Thus
E3(b
∗, c∗) whenever exists, is locally asymptotically stable without any condition.
Theorem 2. Model system (4) does not have any limit cycle in the interior of the positive
quadrant of the bc-plane.
Proof. Let us consider the following function
H(b, c) =
1
bc
,
which is positive in the interior of the positive quadrant of the bc-plane.
Define
h1(b, c) = β1b(1− b− c)− θbc− µb,
h2(b, c) = β2c(1− b− c) + θbc− µc.
Then we have
∆(b, c) =
∂
∂b
(h1H) +
∂
∂c
(h2H) = −
(
β1
c
+
β2
b
)
< 0.
This shows that ∆(b, c) does not change sign and is not identically zero in the interior of
the positive quadrant of the bc-plane. Therefore, by Bendixson–Dulac criterion, it follows
that there is no closed trajectory and hence no limit cycle in the interior of the positive
quadrant of the bc-plane.
In the following theorem we are able to show that the model system (4) is uniformly
persistent [13, 14]. By the persistence of a system we mean that both the political parties
are present and none of them will go to extinction.
Theorem 3. The model system (4) is uniformly persistent if the conditions of existence of
the equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) holds.
Proof. Let the average Lyapunov function for model system (4) be σ(X) = bpcq , p > 0,
q > 0. Then σ(X) is a nonnegative C1 function in <2+. We note that
Ψ(X) =
1
σ
dσ
dt
= p
[
β1(1− b− c)− θc− µ
]
+ q
[
β2(1− b− c) + θb− µ
]
.
Since there is no periodic orbit in the interior of the positive quadrant of the bc-plane (see
Theorem 2). Thus, to show the uniform persistence of the system it is sufficient to show
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that Ψ(X) > 0 for all equilibria X ∈ bd<2+, for a suitable choice of p, q > 0, i.e. the
following conditions must be satisfied for the persistence of the system:
Ψ(E0) = p[β1 − µ] + q[β2 − µ] > 0, (9)
Ψ(E1) =
q
β1
[
θ(β1 − µ)− µ(β1 − β2)
]
> 0, (10)
Ψ(E2) =
p
β2
[
µ(β1 − β2)− θ(β2 − µ)
]
> 0. (11)
Keeping in mind that for the feasibility of the model system (4), we have β1 > µ.
Now by increasing p to a sufficiently large value, Ψ(E0) can be made positive and thus
condition (9) is satisfied. Again the conditions of existence of equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗)
implies that Ψ(E1) > 0 and Ψ(E2) > 0, and thus conditions (10) and (11) are also
satisfied. This proves the theorem.
Theorem 4. If the equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) is locally asymptotically stable, then it is
globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. Let Γ (t) = (b(t), c(t)) be any one non-trivial periodic orbit of system (4) with
period T > 0. To prove the theorem it is enough to show that
T∫
0
tr
(
J
(
b(t), c(t)
))
dt < 0,
where J is the Jacobian matrix.
Since
T∫
0
[
β1
(
1− b(t)− c(t))− θc(t)− µ] dt = T∫
0
b′(t)
b(t)
dt = 0
and
T∫
0
[
β2
(
1− b(t)− c(t))+ θb(t)− µ] dt = T∫
0
c′(t)
c(t)
dt = 0.
So we have
T∫
0
tr
(
J
(
b(t), c(t)
))
dt =
T∫
0
[−β1b(t)− β2c(t)] dt < 0.
Hence the divergency criterion [12] implies that all the periodic solutions must be orbitally
stable. This is impossible, since E3(b∗, c∗) is locally asymptotically stable. Thus, the
system (4) has no periodic orbit in <2+. Since the equilibria E0(0, 0), E1(1 − µ/β1, 0),
E2(0, 1− µ/β2) are unstable equilibria, the theorem follows immediately.
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5 Numerical example
To check the feasibility of our analysis regarding existence conditions and stability of
various equilibria, we have conducted some numerical computation by choosing the val-
ues of parameters in model (1) as given in (12). Since the realistic data is not available
regarding movement of members from one political party to another, we have intuitively
assumed the hypothetical parameter values so as the existence conditions are satisfied at
least for a set of parameter values.
As we know that the constitution of most of the countries all around the world gives
the right of voting to a person when he acquires the age of 18 years. A person also loses his
interest in politics i.e. in voting to any party when he crosses 78 years of age due to his old
age and health problems. With these reasons, we may assume that persons are involved in
politics only between the age of 18–78 years old, thus we may take µ ≈ 1/60. Because
voters are susceptible to both political parties, thus each political party pays much more
attention on the recruitment from this voters class. Let the per capita recruitment rate from
the voters class to the party B is 1/24. This implies that approximately 24 members of
political party B are able to convince 01 voter in a year to join their party. Let us assume
that the per capita recruitment rate from voters class to the political party C is 1/36. At
the same time it is also assumed that the per capita recruitment rate from the political
party C to B is 7/720 and from B to C is 17/720. The above data implies that political
party B pays much attention on the new recruitment from the voters class, however does
not pay sufficient attention on their existing members. In contrast political party C pays
some less attention (in comparison to party B) on the recruitment from voters class but
more attention on their members. The per capita rate of leaving party B and taking the
membership of party C is more than that of leaving party C and joining party B.
Thus for the above situation we have the following set of parameter values in model
system (1):
β1 =
1
24
, β2 =
1
36
, θ1 =
17
720
, θ2 =
7
720
, µ =
1
60
. (12)
For the above set of parameter values, we note that θ1 > θ2 and θ1 − θ2 = θ = 1/72.
It may also be checked that for these parameter values, the conditions of existence of
interior equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) of model system (4) are satisfied. The values of b∗ and c∗
are obtained as 0.2 and 0.3 respectively.
In this case, we have numerically calculated eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix using
above parameter values. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the
equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗) are obtained as, (−3 +
√
6)/360 and (−3−√6)/360. It may be
noted that these are negative, hence E3(b∗, c∗) is locally stable.
We have made the simulation analysis of our model system (4) for the above set of
parameter values. In Fig. 2, we have shown the variations of political party B and C with
respect to time t. From this figure it is easy to note that if both parties have started with
same number of members then for some time political party B will lead over C but after
some time result will be reversed i.e party C will lead over B.
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In Fig. 3, we have shown the global stability of interior equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗). We
have made the trajectories with different initial starts and it may be noted that all the
trajectories are approaching to the interior equilibrium, which shows the global stability
of the equilibrium E3(b∗, c∗).
In model system (4), θ is a very sensitive parameter. In Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we made the
graphs of variation of political party B and C with respect to time t for different values
of θ. From these figures it is clear that as the value of θ increases the members of political
party B decreases whereas members in party C increases.
Fig. 2. Variation of political parties with
respect to time t.
Fig. 3. Global stability of equilibrium
E3(b
∗, c∗).
Fig. 4. Variation of partyB with respect
to time t for different values of θ.
Fig. 5. Variation of partyC with respect
to time t for different values of θ.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed and analyzed an epidemiological type nonlinear mathe-
matical model for two political parties. Each party depends on its solid core of support-
ers/members to sustain it through difficult times. A party may die out if it does not have
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solid members/supporters. The analysis of model shows that if the net rate of shifting
of members from political party B to C (i.e. θ) is greater than µ(β1 − β2)/(β2 − µ),
then political party B will die out. On the other hand as we have taken that recruitment
from voters class to political party B is greater than political party C (i.e. β1 > β2) so if
θ < µ(β1 − β2)/(β1 − µ), then political partyC will die out. So for the existence of both
the political parties θ must lie in the open interval (µ(β1 − β2)/(β1 − µ), µ(β1 − β2)/
(β2 − µ)). This suggests that for the survival of any political party; retaining the existing
members is more important than new recruitment of members from voters class. If the
party members/workers leave the party and join another party, then in this case the survival
of the party may be difficult. In fact party should make changes time to time in their
ideology according to the existing members of the party. The changes should be made in
the party’s ideology by considering the various factors like, socioeconomic, demographic,
religion, race, gender, etc., in such a way that individuals from voters class get attracted to
join the party and existing members also be satisfied. Numerical simulation also suggests
that a small change in the movement of one party to another may change the results very
fast. For the real democracy both the parties should pay much attention on their members
as well as on the contacts to the voters. Uniform persistence of the model implies that if
both parties exist then will exist under certain conditions.
This model may be generalized by considering a third political party, which may affect
the dynamics of the political scenario of any country. The another generalization of the
above model is considering the effect of time delay involved in moving from one political
party to another. These are left for future research.
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